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Abstract
With the advent and popularity of social networking sites, the boundaries of the rela-
tionship between the employer and employee/prospective employee have stretched well
beyond the workplace and working hours. Predictably, this relationship expansion has
ledAQ 1 to uncharted adversarial scenarios between the respective parties. Unfortunately, in
this new, vibrant cyber world, traditional employment law considerations are struggling
for deference and rumination. Notwithstanding this ostensible indifferenceAQ 2 , each phase
of the relationship is heavily impacted by social network media. Applicant recruitment,
information gathering and applicant selection stand to be impacted by the social network
communications made by employees or prospective employees. This article examines
whether present and proposed law protects job applicants from potential, unlawful
discrimination resulting from the employer’s use of social media in its applicant
recruitment, information-gathering and applicant selection processes.
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Introduction
With the advent and popularity of social network sites, the boundaries of the relationship
between the employer and employee/prospective employee have stretched well beyond
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the workplace and working hours. Predictably, this relationship expansion has led to
uncharted adversarial scenarios between the respective parties.
Ensuing legal disputes necessitate an expansion of the law’s applicability to this new
world, or new legislation for it. The respective parties, employers especially, require a level
of predictability regarding their respective rights and duties. While this predictability can
only be offered by a bodyofwell settled law, unfortunately, in this new, vibrant cyberworld,
traditional employment law considerations are struggling for deference and rumination.AQ 3
Notwithstanding this ostensible indifference,AQ 4 each phase of the relationship is heavily
impacted by social network media. Applicant recruitment, information gathering and
candidate selection stand to be impacted by the social network communications made
by employees or prospective employees. While the number of Facebook users has
reached 1 billion, no legislation exists specifically regulating the employer’s access to
and use of social network information for hiring and firing purposes.
This article examines whether present and proposed law protects employees’ and
prospective employees’ rights from potential unlawful discrimination resulting from the
employer’s use of social media in its applicant recruitment, information-gathering and
applicant selection processes.1
The employer’s interests
2
Employers should look
The employer’s desire to obtain and digest all possible information regarding a job appli-
cant prior to selection is a logical business interest. A preliminary study finds a strong
correlation between job performance and Facebook profiles (Kluemper et al., 2012).
In a study published in the Journal of Applied Social Psychology, raters were asked to
rate university students by personality related questions, such as ‘[I]s this person depend-
able?’ after viewing the student’s Facebook page only (ibid.). Raters were, in essence,
asked to form impressions of an applicant based solely on viewing the publicly available
material (photos, status updates and conversations) on the applicant’s Facebook page.
The raters then assigned a grade to each applicant for the attributes of a good
employee: emotional stability, conscientiousness, extroversion, intellectual curiosity
and agreeableness. Such findings were subsequently (six months later) matched to the
student’s job performance evaluation completed by the students’ respective employers.
The study found a clear and strong relationship between ‘good’ Facebook scores and
job performance. Generally, the raters gave positive grades to students who traveled
and had many friends and a variety of interests or hobbies.
Such indications suggest that a reasonable employer should review job applicants’
social media communications. In its recruiting and selection process, it is, of course,
in the employer’s interest to distinguish between a poor applicant and a good applicant.
Employers may need to look
Under some circumstances, a review of an applicant’s profile page may be more than a
logical business decision, but may also constitute a legal duty. Employer responsibility
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for the actions of an employee can potentially be based on two different theories. First,
under the doctrine of respondeat superior, when the employee commits a tort while in
the course of his employment duties, the employer is rendered liable to the victim of the
tort (Epstein, 2008: 432). While it is true that this type of vicarious liability, generally,
does not create an affirmative duty to peruse an applicant’s profile page prior to offering
the position,3 a prudent employer would be better served to conduct such review in
search of evidence for propensity toward tortious conduct (Mooney, 2010: 758).
Second, unlike vicarious liability, which is based on the indirect liability of the
employer, direct liability may also be imposed on the employer for the eventual tortious
acts of the employee.
4
An employer may be directly liable based on the theory of negli-
gent hiring. This doctrine stems from pure negligence concepts, that is, an employer
must exercise reasonable care when hiring a person to perform specific duties.
5
For
example, an employer may be deemed to be acting unreasonably, i.e. negligently, when
it employs a person, previously convicted of child abuse, to work in a position entailing
direct contact with children, if harm to the children ensues. Most states’ law holds
employers liable for the tortious acts of the employee when the employees’ tortious acts
were reasonably foreseeable at the time of hiring (Larson, 2010: pt. 1, ch. 11AQ 5 ). Negligent
hiring is based on the fact that it was negligent for an employer to hire the employee
given what the employer knew or should have known about the employee at the time
of hiring. Using Connecticut as an example, ‘[t]he ultimate test of the existence of the
duty to use care is found in the foreseeability that harm may result if it is not exercised.’
6
‘It is well settled that defendants cannot be held liable for their alleged negligent hiring
[ . . . ] of an employee accused of wrongful conduct unless they had notice of said
employee’s propensity for the type of behavior causing the plaintiff’s harm.’
7
Since foreseeability is the basis of this tort, the inevitable question is whether employ-
ers must perform a perfunctory investigation of an applicant’s profile page (especially
given the relative ease of doing so) prior to employing the candidate. No case has expli-
citly found that a failure to review online information before hiring an employee who
later commits a tort constitutes negligence hiring. Other than statutorily required back-
ground checks in connection with sensitive positions such as teachers and law enforce-
ment personnel,
8
current law is not clear on this point.9AQ 6 Some courts have imputed to
employers the obligation to investigate an applicant’s background.
10
In other jurisdic-
tions the existence of the duty may depend on the nature of the position sought, the hazar-
dous nature of the employee’s tasks, the level of interaction of employee with public and
the correlation between the employee’s prior misconduct and the nature of the position
sought.
11
Notwithstanding this lack of clarity, seemingly, it is in the interest of the
employer to conduct a review of an applicant’s profile before hiring the applicant.
12
Employers do in fact look
In fact, employers do conduct reviews of applicants’ profile pages. According to a study
conducted for CareerBuilder.com by Harris Interactive, 45% of employers surveyed use
social networks to select applicants.
13
Just one year earlier, a similar study found that
22% of employers were using social network sites such as Facebook, MySpace, Twitter
and LinkedIn to review applicants.
14
The study found that 35% of employers based their
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decision to deny applicants jobs on the content viewed on the respective applicant’s
social networking site.
15
In the study, Facebook proved to be the most popular social
media site for employers to conduct their applicant screening (followed by LinkedIn,
MySpace and Twitter).
16
Over 50% of the employers who participated in the survey
stated that provocative photos played the biggest role in a decision not to hire an appli-
cant, while 44% of employers used applicants’ references to drinking and drug use as red
flags as a contributor to not employing the applicant.
17
A survey commissioned byMicro-
soft in 2010 also showed that 79% of the U.S. employers which participated in the study
used the Internet to screen applicants and that 70% employers rejected applicants based
on the search results (Cross-Tab, 2010).
Not only have employers demonstrated their willingness to search profiles, but
recently they have also demanded applicants’ passwords to respective social media sites
as a condition of employment.
18
The practice first came to attention when the Maryland
Division of Corrections (DOC) policy required that job applicants for employment with
the DOC provide the government with their social media account usernames and per-
sonal passwords for use in employee background checks (Curtis, n.d.). As consequence,
a corrections officer named Robert Collins was required to provide his Facebook login
and password to the DOC. During the interview the interviewer logged on to Collins’s
social media site and read the latter’s postings and those of his family and friends.
The above conclusions indicate that the employer (1) should review profiles, (2) at
times may need to review profiles, (3) most times will review the profiles and (4) will
use the information contained in profiles to deny a position. Stated differently, the law
cannot and should not stop employers from searching profiles. How are these legitimate
business and legal concerns contrary to the interests of the applicant?
The applicant’s interests
It is the applicant’s interest to participate in the world of social media sites without
giving up the opportunity to gain employment because of merit or without being denied
a position because of age, for example. However, when viewing unconstrained media
site profiles, an employer is likely to discern, among other things, the age, religion, color,
race, gender, disability, sexual orientation, military status or nationality of an applicant.
This information gives the employer the ability to go beyond legitimate applicant recruit-
ment and selection. The employer is afforded the opportunity to enter the realm of
unlawful discrimination.
Typically, other than an applicant’s gender (most times discoverable from the name
on application) the applicant’s attributes are likely to be revealed only after an interview.
In fact, some characteristics may never be discovered. However, a pre-interview review
of a profile is likely to reveal the above-mentioned classifications before the applicant
meets with employer. Accordingly, the employer’s ability to discriminate is greatly
facilitated.
If the description of the issue were to end here, one could argue that social media sites
have done nothing more than reduce the world to a small town; that is, a place where all
residents (including employers) know the characteristics of all their neighbors (including
job candidates) prior to any job interview. Consequently, one could argue, the ability to
4 International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 00(0)
discriminate using profiles has been facilitated only to the levels present in any small
town where everyone knows everyone else. However, this argument would fail.
The adversarial system: no notice – no fight
Litigation
A fundamental difference exists between a small town and the cyber world: in the small
town, the applicant has knowledge of the fact that the employer has the knowledge nec-
essary to discriminate prior to an interview. The employer, for example, knowing the
applicant’s age before an interview, may decide not to select the applicant for an inter-
view because of her age. The applicant, on the other hand, has the knowledge to suspect
discriminatory conduct and therefore the ability to consider pursuing legal redress.
In the world of online profiles, however, absent an in-person interview, an applicant is
not likely to know that she was denied an interview or position because of her age
(an attribute the employer viewed on her profile), since she, generally, will have no
knowledge of the employer’s review of her profile page. In essence, the employer is ren-
dered free to discriminate without the applicant’s knowledge.
This predicament severely curtails the enforcement of anti-discrimination statues in
the recruitment phase. The U.S. legal system is based on the adversarial system.
19
As
opposed to the inquisitorial systems where a judge or other public decision maker is the
proponent of the facts and legal evaluation,20 ‘an adversary system relies upon the parties
to produce the facts and legal arguments that will be forwarded on their behalf, for such a
system to function properly, the parties must be somewhat equally capable of producing
their cases’ (Rubenstein, 2002AQ 7 ). ‘[The] accepted virtue of the common law, adversarial
system of justice is that it leaves more control in the parties . . .By placing control in the
individual over the state the adversary system reflects deeper values of liberalism and
even natural justice’ (Seligman et al., 2001AQ 8 ). Our decision to resolve legal disputes in this
manner, however, triggers equality concerns (Rubenstein, 2002: 1874). ‘If one side in
adversarial adjudication is ill-equipped – it cannot afford access to the system, or has less
time and money to pursue evidence, or less skill in developing legal claims – then what
emerges as the stronger case might not necessarily be the better case . . . [T]he parties
must be given relatively equal opportunities to present their case’ (ibid.; see also
Wertheimer, 1988). The adversarial system hinges on party control of the investigation
and presentation of evidence.
21
The anticipatory use of social media information by employers does not simply trig-
ger such concerns; it eradicates the adversarial system. More specifically, when an
employer views the content of an applicant’s profile prior to an interview, it gains an
overwhelming competitive edge over the applicant and the law in the adversarial setting.
As stated above, this preliminary view of the profile allows the employer to make the
hiring decision without the applicant’s knowledge that he or she is even under consider-
ation. If an employer discerns an applicant’s color, for example, and bases its decision
not to hire on such factor, it is essentially free to unlawfully discriminate effortlessly and
without much consequence; the applicant will simply never know that this misconduct
has occurred.
22
Without notice of the wrongdoing, the applicant will not seek redress;
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hence, she will not investigate the matter, file a charge of discrimination or litigate the
case; no adversarial setting will ever be called into play. That is, no enforcement of the
anti-discrimination law will occur.
As stated above, in an adversarial system, the parties must be put on equal footing to
present their case (Rubenstein, 2002: 1874). The adversarial system rests on each party’s
ability to investigate and present the evidence (Resnick, 1982: 379). The above-
described applicant is clearly not on equal footing with the employer. In fact, she is likely
to never become one of the adversaries. In essence, social media sites remove possible
discriminatory conduct from the purview of justice by temporally moving such conduct
outside reality and into the cyber world, rendering unlawful discrimination invisible.
Agency enforcement
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has the authority under Title
VII and the ADA to file a Commissioner’s charge independently of an employee or
applicant’s charge,
23
arguably lessening the harm caused by the lack of an adversarial
system. The EEOC Compliance Manual states as follows:
While the principal means for implementing Commission policy is the investigation of
individual charges, EEOC-initiated investigations are a necessary part of the enforcement
process. Discrimination victims are often unaware of their rights or unaware of discrimina-
tory practices. While this is typically so in cases of systemic discrimination, it is also true in
cases where discrimination is less pervasive. Field offices should not hesitate to recommend
Commissioner charges or initiate directed investigations when such action will fulfill
EEOC’s law enforcement mission.
24
The EEOC has a special interest in pattern or practice of discrimination cases because
‘‘‘it has access to the most current statistical computations and analyses regarding
employment patterns’’ [and] was thought to be in the best position ‘‘to determine where
‘pattern or practice’ litigation is warranted’’ and to pursue it.’
25
However, notwithstanding this mandate, in the end, the EEOC’s authority to initiate
its own litigation is rarely used. In 2011, only 47 Commissioner’s charges were filed,
while 99,947 charges were filed by individuals against their employer. The EEOC’s reli-
ance on the adversarial system is evident.
26
Given this heavy reliance, ostensibly, the
EEOC is as powerless as the individual applicant as a means of discovering and redres-
sing discriminatory conduct. After all, with the possible exception of pattern and prac-
tice cases (where statistics play a major role), the EEOC is in no better position than the
applicant when it comes to discovering invisible discriminatory conduct. In the end,
the EEOC’s own enforcement of anti-discrimination law is also rendered less than
efficacious.
The legal (and social) issues are then formulated: How can the law avoid interfering
with the prudent employer’s need to review content that clearly aids in its recruitment
and selection process, and simultaneously deny the employer the opportunity to view and
weigh factors which may potentially lead to unlawful discrimination? And how can the
law achieve this without the applicant’s notice of the unlawful discrimination?
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The irrelevancy of current legislation
27
The password trend
The analysis begins with the most recent trend in the employer–employee/applicant
relationship, that is, the employer’s practice of demanding applicants’ social media site
passwords as a condition of employment or as a part of the hiring (see Maryland Division
of Corrections matter described above). Although new, the practice may be short lived.
Maryland itself became the first state to pass legislation prohibit employers from
requiring applicants and employees to disclose their passwords (the law took effect on
1 October 2012).
28
On 1 August 2012, Illinois signed into law (effective 1 January
2013) amendments to the Right to Privacy in the Workplace Act,
29
thereby prohibiting,
among other things, employers from asking applicants and employees to provide pass-
words and log-in information to personal social networking sites. Similar legislation has
been introduced in California, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New
York, South Carolina and Washington.
Congress is currently considering two related bills. In April 2012, Representatives
Eliot Engel and Jan Schakowsky introduced the Social NetworkingOnline ProtectionAct,
30
and, in May 2012, Senator Richard Blumenthal and Representative Martin Heinrich
introduced the Password Protection Act of 2012.
31
Both proposed laws would prohibit
employers from, among other things, requiring or asking an employee or applicant to pro-
vide a password for access to a personal social media account.
The proposed bills have been referred, respectively, to the House Committee on the
Judiciary and the House Committee on Education and theWorkforce. However, notwith-
standing the recent re-election of President Obama, the likelihood that such proposals
will be enacted into law remains low; the U.S. House of Representatives remains in con-
trol of the Republicans and the primary sponsors of the bills are Democrats.
32
Regardless
of the likelihood of passage, the proposals have, ostensibly, sent a clear message to
employers, and, in the end, state legislation (if the trend continues) is likely to render
federal law unnecessary.
Lawmakers’ overall reaction to this latest practice indicates that employees will not
be subject to the password requirement. However, the legislative reaction does not pro-
tect the employees from the use of information that is openly available on the Internet.
The Fair Credit Reporting Act
The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), among other things, regulates employment back-
ground checks performed by third parties on behalf of an employer.
33
The Act requires that,
when a third party prepares a background check of an employee or applicant, the latter
must be notified of the investigation, given the opportunity to give or refuse consent, and
notified if information from the report if used to make an adverse hiring decision. The
FCRA requires an employer to ‘clearly and accurately notify applicants in writing if they
will be the subject of a consumer credit report prepared by a consumer reporting agency.’AQ 9
Unfortunately, the FCRA and its protections do not apply when an employer performs
its own profile search. Accordingly, the FCRA would be of no aid to the aforementioned
applicant.
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Stored communications statutes
As stated above, this article’s analysis is based on applicants whose profile is public. In
instances where the applicant’s media site is not public but is nevertheless accessed by an
employer without the applicant’s consent, a violation of the Stored Communications Act
may be found. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)
34
includes federal
wiretapping laws and federal laws prohibiting unauthorized access to communications
in electronic storage.
Title II of the ECPA created the Stored Communications Act (SCA),
35
intended to
‘address access to stored wire and electronic communications and transactional records.’AQ 10
The SCA makes it a federal crime for anyone to ‘access’ without ‘authorization’, or in
excess of authorization, a ‘facility providing electronic communication services and
thereby obtaining access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic
storage.’AQ 11 The SCA would be of no help to an applicant with a public profile.
36
Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
Although this Act is often used by employers to pursue claims against their employees,
arguably, an employer who exceeds its authorized access to a profile or the social net-
work’s server may be in violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).
37
Again, however, the CFAA would be of no help to an applicant with a public profile.
Title VII, the ADA and the ADEA
An array of anti-discrimination statutes exists if we consider state and federal law. The
most fundamental federal statutes, however, follow. Under Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act,
38
an employer shall not ‘fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.’
39
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
40
an employer cannot make an adverse employment decisions against ‘an individual with
a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.’AQ 12 Pursuant to
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), it is against the law for an
employer ‘to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discrimi-
nate against any individual ... because of such individual’s age.’
41
As a consequence of this legislation and disparate treatment and disparate impact
principles, employers are prohibited or discouraged from making inquiries such as the
following examples:
42
What is your race?
What is your national origin?
What is your religion?
How old are you?
Are you disabled?
Are you married?
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Do you have children?
Do you plan to have children?
Are you pregnant or planning to become pregnant?
How much do you weigh?
What is your religion?
43
The introduction of social media sites into this paradigm demonstrates the absolute irre-
levance of employment law in the cyber world. A profile or even simply a posted photo
of an applicant may offer the employer the answer to most of these inquiries, without the
need to pose a single unlawful question. Also, as stated above, the employer can collect
and consume such responses without the applicant’s knowledge that she is unknowingly
responding to unlawful inquiries. To a great extent, this represents the demise of anti-
discrimination protection at the employee online recruitment and selection phase. The
more the employer looks, the more it sees; the more it sees, the greater the potential for
discrimination.
In the end, no current federal statute specifically prohibits employers from obtaining
or utilizing information gathered from profile searches.
Conclusion and recommendations
The preliminary findings of this note are as follows: (1) the employer should review pro-
files, (2) the employer may need to review profiles, (3) the employer will, generally,
review profiles and (4) the employer will, generally, use information contained in profile
to make a hiring decision. It is also clear that (5) the employer’s review of social media
sites takes any potential discriminatory conduct outside the temporal parameters contem-
plated by current anti-discrimination statutes, and, consequently, (6) the applicant and
the EEOC are unlikely to discover the discriminatory conduct. Finally, (7) without notice
of the misconduct, the adversarial system stops functioning and (8) with it the enforce-
ment of anti-discrimination law at that employment phase.
Based on these conclusions, it seems clear that the law cannot (and should not) stop
employers from searching profiles. Accordingly, to remain consequential in this new
world, anti-discrimination protection must find a presence in that pre-interview slice
of time. Two avenues seem most apt for achieving this end.
Reporting searches
The first option is to steer away from the reasoning reflected in the current ‘password-
related legislation’ discussed above. That is, given the absence of an adversarial system
to enforce the law, a categorical prohibition of employer’s use of social media content in
hiring decisions would be less than a weak warning. Since it seems clear that employers
are actually using the online content to make decisions, the first clear choice is to
require employers to report to the EEOC and the applicant every instance of social
media site review (in the context of making hiring-related decision). As a result, the
applicant and the EEOC would have notice of the review and the option to re-enter the
adversarial system should discriminatory conduct be suspected.
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The reporting system currently required by the FCRA should be expanded.
44
As stated
above, among other things, this law regulates employment background checks per-
formed by third parties on behalf of an employer.
45
The Act requires that, when a third
party prepares a background check of an employee or applicant, the employer must
‘clearly and accurately notify applicants in writing if they will be the subject of a con-
sumer credit report prepared by a consumer reporting agency.’AQ 13
65
The FCRA’s protections
have not been expanded to cover an employer that conducts its own background check.
Amending the law to make it applicable to an employer’s own searches would, as stated
above, reactivate the adversarial system by giving notice to the applicant and the EEOC.
Of course, traces of the problem remain: How can one ascertain if the self-regulated
reporting is a true reflection of the employer’s searches? For unscrupulous employers,
the ones more likely to discriminate, the searches and the discrimination would and
could easily remain invisible.
The small town presumption
The second option consists of applying a rebuttable presumption element to discrimina-
tion cases dealing with this issue. In discrimination cases related to this issue, employers
would hold the burden of rebutting the presumption that they did view social media sites
when they made their hiring decision. This is arguably a quasi-irrefutable presumption in
instances where an employer has an actual, declared Internet screening policy.
Obviously, the employer’s burden of rebutting the presumption would be onerous.
However, placing this burden on the employer in order to rescue the adversarial system
is a burden worth imposing. In the end, such a presumption would create no greater bur-
den than that of an employer operating in the small town alluded to above. As in the
small town, the presumption puts the two adversaries on equal footing by giving the
applicant constructive notice of the employer’s profile review. Consequently, as in the
small town, the employer knows the applicant and the applicant knows this fact prior
to recruitment efforts. This ‘small town presumption’ is as imperfect as the current effec-
tiveness of existing anti-discrimination legislation in small communities. However, at a
minimum, it offers such body of law presence and relevancy in the cyber world.
Notes
1. The focus of this article is on the effects of social media sites/profiles on discriminatory
practices in the workplace. However, it should be mentioned that the growth of such com-
munications has also impacted employee privacy, discipline and discharge, and has also not
left union-protected employees unscathed.
Several cases have seen the application of tort-based legal theories such as defamation,
invasion of privacy, wrongful disclosure of confidential information or trade secrets. Cases
against public employers also rely on the U.S. Constitution, arguing that profile searches con-
stitute an unreasonable search and seizure. Other cases have raised exceptions to the general at-
will doctrine such as violation of public policy and statutory protections such as anti-retaliation
statutes based on protected activities such as free speech.
For examples of cases dealing with discipline and discharge of employees due to social
media site posts, see Simonetti v. Delta Airlines, No. 1:05-CV-2321, 2005 WL 2407621
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(N.D. Ga. Sept. 7, 2005), in which a flight attendant posted a suggestive photo of herself on
MySpace page and was later discharged for the same; and Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp.,
No. 06-5754 (FSH), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108834 (D.N.J. July 25, 2008), in which an
employee was discharged after starting a MySpace page and posting numerous comments
about management. See also www.higheredmorning.com/professor-suspended-for-facebook-
posts (accessed 1 September 2012), regarding a professor who was suspended after a student
reported humorous comments on her Facebook page, about ‘‘not wanting to kill’’ any students
that day; see also Webley (2011).
Social media sites’ popularity has also impacted union-protected employees. On 30 May
2012, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), through its Acting General Counsel
(GC), issued a third Operations Management Memo on social media cases in less than a year;
see www.nlrb.gov/news/acting-general-counsel-releases-report-employer-social-media-policies
(accessed 8 July 2012).
See also the 2011 NLRB survey, which indicates that the NLRB has reviewed more
than 129 cases involving social media sites. The central issues of cases regard discharge
or discipline of employees based on their social media posts and whether the posts are a
protected activity under the National Labor Relations Act; see www.uschamber.com/sites/
default/files/reports/NLRB%20Social%20Media%20Survey%20-%20FINAL.pdf (accessed
28 August 2012).
2. Throughout this article, the terms ‘social media site’ and ‘profile’ are used synonymously and
are defined as follows: a form of electronic communication (such as websites for social net-
working and microblogging) through which users create online communities to share informa-
tion, ideas, personal messages and other content (such as videos). See www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/social%20media (accessed 23 September 2012). Popular examples include
Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn and YouTube.
Throughout this article it presumed that an applicant’s social media site/profile (such as a
Facebook profile) is public and not protected by privacy settings.
3. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(1) (1958).
4. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213 (1958).
5. Ibid.
6. Perodeau v. Hartford, 259 Conn. 729, 754, 792 A .2d 752 (2002).
7. Knicrumah v. Albany City School District, 241 F.Sup.2d 199, 211 (N.D.N.Y.2003).
8. For example, Connecticut law requires all public school employees hired on or after 1 July
1994 to submit to state and national criminal history record checks when they are hired.
According to a survey by Education Week, 42 states require criminal background checks for
teacher certification. The states that do not have background check requirements for teachers
are Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee and
Wisconsin. See Education Week (2003).
10. See, for example, Kendall v. Gore Props, Inc., 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. 1956);Weiss v. Furniture in
the Raw, 306 N.Y.S.2d 253 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1969); Robertson v. Church of God Int’l, 978 S.W.
2d 120, 125 (Tex. App. 1997) (‘One who retains the services of another has a duty to
investigate the background of that individual for fitness for the position....’).
11. ‘Liability of the employer is predicated on the employer’s antecedent ability to recognize a
potential employee’s ‘‘attribute[s] of character or prior conduct’’ which would create an undue
risk of harm to those with whom the employee came in contact in executing his employment
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responsibilities.... The scope of the employer’s duty in exercising reasonable care in a hiring
decision depends on the employee’s anticipated degree of contact with other persons in car-
rying out the duties of employment. The requisite degree of care increases, and may require
expanded inquiry into the employee’s background, when the employer expects the employee
to have frequent contact with the public or when the nature of the employment fosters close
contact and a special relationship between particular persons and the employee.’ Moses v.
Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 323–324 at 327–328 (Colo.1993), cert. denied, 511
U.S. 1137, 114 S.Ct. 2153, 128 L.Ed.2d 880 (1994) (citations omitted), quoting Connes v.
Molalla Transport System, Inc., 831 P.2d 1316, 1321 (Colo.1992).
For example, in Ponticas v. K.M.S. Invs., 331 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn. 1983), ‘the apart-
ment manager had access to tenants’ homes, his employer had a duty to conduct a reasonable
investigation to explore whether the manager posed a high risk of injury to the apartment com-
plex’s residents. The employee in question had a criminal history of armed robbery and other
felonies that a cursory criminal background check would have revealed. Additionally, the
employee had listed his mother and sister as his employment references. Due to the ease with
which the employer could have discovered that the employee had committed violent crimes and
had provided sham employment references, the court upheld the jury’s finding that the
employer was liable for negligent hiring’(Peebles, 2012: 1397).
See also Bick (2009a,b).
12. In jurisdictions where the duty clearly does not exist, an argument could be made that, if an
employer may only be liable for what is reasonably foreseeable, it behooves him not to review
any profiles and to argue ignorance of any of the applicant’s propensities. However, as can be
learned from the statistics below, the employer is likely to deem the benefits of a search to
outweigh the possible consequences of the review.
13. www.careerbuilder.com/share/aboutus/pressreleasesdetail.aspx?id¼pr519&sd¼8/19/
2009&ed¼12/31/2009 (accessed 30 June 2012).
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. This trend has been met with opposition, as discussed below.
19. See, for example, Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981) (‘[O]ur adversary
system presupposes [that] accurate and just results are most likely to be obtained through the
equal contest of opposed interests...’); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 n.2 (1991)
(‘What makes a system adversarial rather than inquisitorial is ... the presence of a judge who
does not (as an inquisitor does) conduct the factual and legal investigation himself, but instead
decides on the basis of facts and arguments pro and con adduced by the parties’).
20. As is the case in most of Europe (see Langbein, 1985).
21. Resnik (1982: 380 n.23); see also Resnik (2000: 2136) (‘Equipage for civil litigants – from
filing fees to investigation to counsel for experts – is generally left either to the legislature or to
the market’).
22. Arguably, an applicant could hire an expert to find an online trail left by an employer’s search.
However, without some notice of the employer’s search or suspicion thereof, the applicant’s
curiosity is unlikely to be sufficiently aroused to take such steps. Also, in the cases where the
suspicion or notice is present, the cost of such steps may be prohibitive.
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (all discussed below) do require employers to retain appli-
cations and other personnel records relating to hiring process. One could argue that such
records could be used to trigger investigations, etc. However, the unscrupulous employer, the
one most likely to discriminate, is unlikely to abide by this law if it knows the chances of being
found out are minimal. Moreover, the applicant is not automatically entitled to a copy of such
records, so who would review such innumerable documents?
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(e) (2008); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.7–11; § 2000e-5(b);
1 EEOC Compliance Manual (BNA) 8:0001 (2001) (hereinafter referred to as EEOC
Intake): ‘Under Title VII/ADA, EEOC must have a basis to investigate possible violations and
must obtain a Commissioner charge and notify the respondent of such basis by specifying the
date, place and circumstances to be covered by the investigation. Under ADEA/EPA, there are
no prerequisites which must be met to investigate.’
No Commissioner’s charge provisions are found in the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) and the EPAAQ 14 ; however, the EEOC may investigate violations of these two statutes
(EEOC Intake).
24. Ibid.
25. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 69 (1984).
26. www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/2011par.pdf (accessed 18 September 2012).
27. With some exceptions, the ensuing discussion does not examine state (U.S.) anti-discrimination
law, but focuses on pertinent federal law.
28. To be codified at Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-712.
29. Illinois HB 3782 amends the state’s Right to Privacy in the Workplace Act.
30. H.R. 5050, 112th Cong., 2d Sess. (Apr. 27, 2012).
31. S. 3074, 112th Cong., 2d Sess. (May 9, 2012).
32. www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr5050 (accessed 10 November 2012); www.govtrack.
us/congress/bills/112/hr5684 (accessed 10 November 2012).
33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681t (2000 & Supp. 2003).
34. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522
35. 18 U.S.C. Chapter 121 §§ 2701–2712.
36. In Crispin v. Christian Audigier Inc.,717 F. Supp. 2d 965 (C.D. Cal. 2010), a federal district
court decided that the SCA applies to social media posts, provided that a posting had estab-
lished privacy settings, was content electronically stored within the meaning of the SCA and
thus could not be accessed without authorization.
See also Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Group, 2008 WL 6085437; and Konop v. Hawaiian
Airlines, Inc., 236 F.3d 1035 (2001) (D.N.J. July 24, 2008), making it clear that under
some circumstances unconsented access to private media sites may constitute a violation
of the SCA.
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 (2000).
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1).
40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2000).
41. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2000).
42. Many of such questions are not explicitly prohibited by the language of the aforementioned
anti-discrimination laws (except for the ADA), but in some cases have been de facto made
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unlawful by federal regulations and EEOC guidance. It is beyond the scope of this article to
discuss specific federal regulations and EEOC guidance regulating such inquiries.
43. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2000).
44. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681t (2000 & Supp. 2003).
45. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
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